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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/ Appellee,

:

v.

:

Case No. 20080701-CA

GREG C. JOHNSON, and KERRY E. LYNN, :
Defendants / Appellants.

:

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF / APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The defendants had been convicted of Wanton Destruction of Trophy Deer
Without a Valid License, a third-degree felony, on April 22,2002. R. 27-30, 159-62. On
July 30, 2007, defendants asked the district court in their criminal cases to order the
Division of Wildlife Resources to reinstate the defendants' hunting privileges. R. 51-64,
177-90. The district court denied these motions on July 17, 2008. R. 126-29, 267-72.
Defendants filed their notices of appeal on August 14, 2008. R. 130-31, 271-72. This
Court consolidated these two actions on September 17, 2008. R. 132, 273.
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008).
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. This Court is without subject matter jurisdiction because the defendants failed
to exhaust their available administrative remedies.
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. Subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any
time. Hous. Auth. of the County of Salt Lake v. Snvder. 2002 UT 28,111, 44 P.3d 724.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "[T]he initial inquiry of any court should always be
to determine whether the requested action is within its jurisdiction. When a matter is
outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the action." VarianEimac. Inc. v. Lamoreaux. 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989).
2. The district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in interpreting its own
order as creating a separate judicial suspension of the defendants' hunting privileges and
not as a modification of the preexisting administrative suspension.
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was raised below and was the basis
for the district court's decision. R. 69-75,195-200,126-29,267-70.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "A court's interpretation of its own order is
reviewed for clear abuse of discretion and we afford the district court great deference."
Uintah Basin Med. Or. v. Hardy. 2008 UT 15, f 9, 179 P.3d 786.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
All such provisions are set forth verbatim in Appendix A to this brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants Johnson and Lynn were convicted of Wanton Destruction of Trophy
Deer Without a Valid License on April 22, 2002, a third degree felony. R. 27-30, 159-62.
Neither the original judgments nor the amended judgments (R. 31-37, 163-168) mention
anything concerning a suspension of the defendants' hunting license or permit privileges.
Defendant Johnson had his big game hunting license and permit privileges
administratively suspended for fourteen years on August 28, 2002 by the Division of
Wildlife Resources. R. 91-93. He did not appeal this decision. Defendant Lynn had his
big game hunting license and permit privileges administratively suspended for twenty-one
years on August 29, 2002 by the Division of Wildlife Resources. R. 217-19. He did not
appeal this decision.
On December 29, 2004, both defendants filed motions asking that their convictions
be reduced from Third Degree Felonies to Class A Misdemeanors and that their hunting
privileges be suspended for five years from the date of their convictions. R. 38-39, 16970. These motions were granted by the district court. R. 49-50,. 275-76.
On July 30, 2007, the defendants asked the district court to order the Division of
Wildlife Resources to reinstate the defendants' hunting privileges. R. 51-64, 177-90.
The district court denied these motions on July 17, 2008. R. 126-29, 267-72. Defendants
filed their notices of appeal on August 14, 2008. R. 130-31, 271-72. This Court
consolidated these two actions on September 17, 2008. R. 132 273
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This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008).
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Defendants Johnson and Lynn were convicted of Wanton Destruction of Trophy
Deer Without a Valid License on April 22, 2002, a third degree felony. R. 27-30, 159-62.
The original judgments provide that "[u]pon the successful completion of 24 months of
probation, the defendant may file a 402B motion to have the felony reduced to a Class A
misdemeanor and the State will not oppose the motion." R. 33, 161. No mention is made
in the judgment, or the amended judgments (R. 31-37, 163-168) concerning any
suspension of the defendants' hunting license or permit privileges.
On July 8, 2002, notices of agency action were mailed to the defendants informing
them that the Division of Wildlife Resources was commencing adjudicative proceedings
to consider suspending the defendants' "privileges to harvest protected wildlife in the
State of Utah." R. 84-88, 210-14. Neither defendant responded to the notices of agency
action that they received. Both failed to participate in the administrative adjudicative
proceedings. This led to default orders being entered suspending the defendants big game
hunting license and permit privileges. R. 91-93, 217-19. Defendant Johnson's privileges
were suspended for fourteen years on August 28, 2002. R. 91-93. Defendant Lynn's
were suspended years on August 29, 2002. R. 217-19. Neither of the defendants
appealed these decisions.
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On December 29, 2004, both defendants filed motions asking that their convictions
be reduced from third degree felonies to class A misdemeanors and that their hunting
privileges be suspended for five years from the date of their convictions. R. 38-39, 16970. These motions were granted by the district court. R. 49-50, 275-76. The court's
orders do not mention the administrative suspensions. They simply state that
"Defendant's hunting privileges are suspended until April 22, 2007 which is five years
from the date of conviction." R. 49, 275.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendants asked the district court, in their criminal actions, to modify the
Division of Wildlife Resources' administrative suspension of their hunting privileges and
reinstate those privileges contrary to the administrative orders. The defendants did not
exhaust their administrative remedies. Instead they failed to even participate in the
administrative adjudicative proceedings and did not appeal the same. They did not
exhaust their available administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. This
Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal because the defendants
have failed to satisfy the precondition of exhausting their available administrative
remedies.
The defendants seek to read into the district court's orders a modification of the
administrative suspensions that is not there. The district court did not clearly abuse its
discretion in reading its own decisions as creating a separate judicial suspension and as
not ordering any action on the part of the Division.
5

ARGUMENT
I. THIS COURT IS WITHOUT SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THIS APPEAL BECAUSE
DEFENDANTS FAILED TO EXHAUST THEIR AVAILABLE
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Defendants sought judicial review of the Division of Wildlife Resources
administrative decisions in their criminal actions. They claim that it was part of their plea
bargains that they would only have their hunting privileges suspended for five years. R.
54, 180. Their criminal judgments, originally and as amended, are silent on this point.
Assuming the correctness of the defendants' allegation, they were aware at the time they
received the notices of agency action and the default orders that the administrative
suspensions were contrary to their claim that they were to serve only a five-year
suspension. But the defendants did not participate in the administrative proceedings.
They did not exhaust their available administrative remedies.
"As a general rule, parties must exhaust applicable administrative remedies as a
prerequisite to seeking judicial review." Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT
74, ^|14, 34 P.3d 180 (internal quotations omitted). "Where this precondition to suit is not
satisfied, courts lack subject matter jurisdiction." Hous. Auth. of the County of Salt Lake
v. Snvder, 2002 UT 28, ^11, 44 P.3d 724. Before seeking judicial review of the
Division's administrative orders the defendants were required to exhaust their
administrative remedies. Their failure to do so means that this Court is without subject
matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
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The requirement to exhaust administrative remedies does not apply only to direct
judicial review of administrative decisions. Snyder involved an unlawful detainer action.
Federal law required that the housing authority provide an administrative grievance
hearing before it could seek to evict a tenant. Snyder, 2002 UT 28 at ^13. Because the
authority had failed to make an administrative hearing available to Snyder, the Supreme
Court held that the courts were without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the separate
unlawful detainer action.
Housing Authority therefore failed to exhaust its administrative remedies
and had no right to seek relief from the district court. As a result, the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Housing Authority's
unlawful detainer action.
Id at 1J22 (citation omitted).
Nor do any of the exceptions to the exhaustion remedy apply.
As a general rule, parties must exhaust applicable administrative
remedies as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review. Exceptions to this
rule exist in unusual circumstances where it appears that there is a
likelihood that some oppression or injustice is occurring such that it would
be unconscionable not to review the alleged grievance or where it appears
that exhaustion would serve no useful purpose. There is no question but
that the law does not require litigants to do a futile or vain act, but HTC has
not convinced us that appealing the city's rejection of its application in the
manner required by state statute and city ordinance would have been futile.
Holladav Towne Ctr. v. Holladav City. 2008 UT App 301,1(6, 192 P.3d 302 (citations
omitted) (internal quotations omitted). In rejecting a claim of unusual circumstances, this
Court held that political considerations that might impact Holladay City's decisions in the
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administrative proceedings did not meet the unusual circumstances exception. Holladay
City. 2008 UTApp 301 at H7.
Defendants could have raised in the administrative adjudicative proceedings their
claim that they were to serve only a five year suspension of their hunting privileges.
They certainly could have challenged the decisions of the Division on administrative
review as being contrary to their interpretation of the criminal court's decision. It would
not have been a futile or vain gesture to make this argument in the administrative
proceeding. But the defendants' failure to participate in the administrative hearings is
unexcused. They chose not to exhaust their available administrative remedies. Their
actions prevent this Court from obtaining subject matter jurisdiction over their appeal.
This Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to consider the defendants'
appeal. This appeal should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT CLEARLY ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN INTERPRETING ITS OWN ORDERS
Defendants asked the district court to interpret its criminal judgments and orders as
modifying and revoking the administrative suspensions of the defendants hunting
privileges. The district court declined to do so, finding that its orders had not been
directed at the Division of Wildlife Resources and did not impact the administrative
suspensions. The district court's decisions are not a clear abuse of its discretion and
should be affirmed on appeal.

8
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A court's interpretation of its own order is reviewed for clear abuse of discretion

and we afford the district court great deference." Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy. 2008
UT 15,1)9, 179 P.3d 786. The trial court is the best interpreter of its own orders. In Re
Consol. Indus. Corp., 360 F.3d 712, 716 (7th Cir. 2004) (bankruptcy court's interpretation
of its own prior orders would not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion); United
States v. Angelini, 607 F.2d 1305, 1308 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying this general rule to
orders in criminal proceedings).
Defendants have failed to show that Judge Lee's decision was a clear abuse of
discretion. At best, defendants seek to show that the district court's prior orders could be
interpreted in a different manner. This does not show a clear abuse of discretion.
In response to the defendants' motions, the district court reduced their convictions
from felonies to misdemeanors. It also suspended their hunting privileges "until April 22,
2007 which is five years from the date of conviction." R. 49, 275. Nothing in the
original criminal judgments, or as amended, mentions anything about a suspension of
their hunting privileges. Nothing in the Orders Granting 402 Motion mentions the
Division of Wildlife Resources or the administrative suspensions the defendants were
serving. It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to interpret these orders as
creating a separate judicial suspension. Such a suspension is permitted under the
applicable statutes.
Utah law authorizes a court to suspend hunting privileges as part of criminal
sentencing. Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-9(9)(a) (West Supp. 2008). The court also has the
9

option of only recommending that the Division of Wildlife Resources take action to
suspend hunting privileges. Id,, § 23-19-9(9)(b) & (d). But the Division is given the
authority to suspend hunting privileges as well. IdL, § 23-19-9(1) through (8).
The Division's hearing officer must suspend a person's hunting privileges if he has
been found guilty, enters a plea in abeyance, pleads guilty or no contest to one of the
listed wildlife related violations. IdL, § 23-19-9(2). In other circumstances the hearing
officer has discretion as to whether or not a person's hunting privileges should be
suspended. ]cL § 23-19-9(7). The length of the defendants' administrative suspensions is
expressly provided by statute, as well as the requirement that the suspension be doubled if
certain aggravating circumstances are found.1 Id. § 23-19(4) and (5).
The primary goal of courts in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the
legislature's intent as evidenced by the plain language of the statute. State v. Burns, 2000
UT 56, ^25, 4 P.3d 795 ("We need look beyond the plain language only if we find some
ambiguity."). "A principal rule of statutory construction is that the terms of a statute
should not be interpreted in a piecemeal fashion, but as a whole" Ajax Magnesium Corp.
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 796 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1990).
"We read the plain language of a statute . . . as a whole and interpret its
provisions in harmony with other provisions in the same statute." "We do
so because a statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is
animated by one general purpose and intent."

1

Johnson's suspension was increased because of his unlawful taking of a trophy
animal. R. 92. Lynn's suspension was increased because of his unlawful taking of a
trophy animal while he was still serving a prior suspension. R. 218.
10

State v. Gallegos, 2007 UT 81,1[12, 171 P.3d 426 (citations omitted).
The statute clearly creates two separate types of suspensions, one judicial and the
other administrative in nature. The plain language of the statute mandates an
administrative suspension be imposed if a person is convicted of certain crimes, as were
the defendants. A separate judicial suspension is also authorized. Nothing in the statute
prohibits both a judicial and administrative suspension be imposed for the same
conviction. The statute only prohibits more than one administrative suspension "for each
single criminal episode." Section 23-19-9(6)(a). The district court did not clearly abuse
its discretion in interpreting its own orders pursuant to their plain language. The 402
orders created judicial suspensions and did not address the separate administrative
suspensions.
Indeed, the statute provides that an administrative suspension can run
consecutively to a judicial suspension. Id, § 23-19-9(6)(c). While consecutive
suspensions are permitted, it was not done in these cases. The judicial suspensions ran
until April 33, 2007. R. 49-50, 275-76. The administrative suspensions run until August
19, 2016 for Johnson, R. 91, and August 19, 2023 for Lynn, R. 217. The trial court was
within its discretion when it interpreted its prior orders as creating a separate suspension
and not being directed at the Division's suspensions:
The defendant cites Utah Code Annotated 23-19-9.1 in support of his
argument. That section reads as follows: "[fjhe division shall promptly
withhold, suspend, restrict, or reinstate the use of a license issued under this
chapter if so ordered by a court."
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The Court finds the 25, January 2005 Order of this Court did not
direct the Division to do anything. Thus, Section 23-19-9.1 does not apply
in this case.
Further, the Court finds if there is a court order suspending hunting
privileges and a similar administrative order entered by the Division, these
orders may run consecutively. See Utah Code Annotated, Section 23-199(6)(c).
The Court concludes there is no basis in this case to require the
Division to change its administrative order concerning suspension of the
defendant's hunting privileges.
R. 127-28, 268-69.
The entirety of the defendants' argument is based on their presumption that the
district court's orders granting 402 motions (R. 49-50, 275-76) did not actually create a
judicial suspension of the defendants' hunting privileges pursuant to the actual words
used. Instead, the defendants argue that the orders were intended to modify the
administrative suspensions, though the Division and its administrative suspensions are not
mentioned. Brief of Appellants at 29.
The district court refused to read into its orders this extra provision. The Orders
Granting 402 Motion state that they are suspending the defendants' hunting privileges for
five years from the date of their convictions. The district court interpreted these orders in
accord with the plain meaning of the language used. Nothing in the orders states an intent
to modify or in any way alter the existing administrative suspensions. Instead the orders
simply establish a separate judicial five-year suspension of the defendants5 hunting
privileges.
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The same is true of the criminal judgments. R. 27-37, 159-68. No mention is
made in any of the judgments of an agreement sanctioned by the Court that any
administrative suspensions would be limited to five years. Indeed, at the time the original
judgments were entered there was, as of yet, no administrative suspension to modify. The
judgments did not suspend the defendants hunting privileges. They do not include any
limitation on the right of the Division to suspend the defendants hunting privileges. The
district court followed the plain language of its decisions in ruling that it had not ordered
the Division to alter or modify the administrative suspensions in any manner.
The district court did not clearly abuse its discretion and its decisions should be
affirmed on appeal.
CONCLUSION
This Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal and should
therefore dismiss the appeal. In the alternative, the district court did not clearly abuse its
discretion by how it interpreted its own orders and its decision should therefore be
affirmed.
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT DESIRE ORAL
ARGUMENT OR A PUBLISHED OPINION
Plaintiff/ appellee does not request oral argument and a published opinion in this
matter, though the plaintiff desires to participate in oral argument if such is held by the
Court.
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Respectfully submitted this

/

day of June, 2009.

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Brief of
Plaintiff/ Appellee, postage prepaid, to the following on this
MARY ANN HANSEN
852 North 910 East
Orem, Utah 84097
Attorney for Defendants / Appellants
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Determinative Statutes and Rules

Utah Code Ann, § 23-19-9 (West Supp. 2008). Suspension of license or permit
privileges — Suspension of certificates of registration.
(1) As used in this section, "license or permit privileges" means the privilege of
applying for, purchasing, and exercising the benefits conferred by a license or permit
issued by the division.
(2) A hearing officer, appointed by the division, may suspend a person's license or
permit privileges if:
(a) in a court of law, the person:
(i) is convicted of:
(A) violating this title or a rule of the Wildlife Board;
(B) killing or injuring domestic livestock while engaged in an activity regulated under
this title; or
(C) violating Section 76-10-508 while engaged in an activity regulated under this title;
(ii) enters into a plea in abeyance agreement, in which the person pleads guilty or no
contest to an offense listed in Subsection (2)(a)(i), and the plea is held in abeyance; or
(iii) is charged with committing an offense listed in Subsection (2)(a)(i), and the
person enters into a diversion agreement which suspends the prosecution of the offense;
and
(b) the hearing officer determines the person committed the offense intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly, as defined in Section 76-2-103.
(3) (a) The Wildlife Board shall make rules establishing guidelines that a hearing
officer shall consider in determining:
(i) the type of license or permit privileges to suspend; and
(ii) the duration of the suspension.
(b) The Wildlife Board shall ensure that the guidelines established under Subsection
(3)(a) are consistent with Subsections (4), (5), and (6).
(4) Except as provided in Subsections (5) and (6), a hearing officer may suspend a
person's license or permit privileges according to Subsection (2) for a period of time not
to exceed:
(a) seven years for:
(i) a felony conviction;
(ii) a plea of guilty or no contest to an offense punishable as a felony, which plea is
held in abeyance pursuant to a plea in abeyance agreement; or
(iii) being charged with an offense punishable as a felony, the prosecution of which is
suspended pursuant to a diversion agreement;
(b) five years for:
(i) a class A misdemeanor conviction;
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(ii) a plea of guilty or no contest to an offense punishable as a class A misdemeanor,
which plea is held in abeyance pursuant to a plea in abeyance agreement; or
(iii) being charged with an offense punishable as a class A misdemeanor, the
prosecution of which is suspended pursuant to a diversion agreement;
(c) three years for:
(i) a class B misdemeanor conviction;
(ii) a plea of guihy or no contest to an offense punishable as a class B misdemeanor
when the plea is held in abeyance according to a plea in abeyance agreement; or
(iii) being charged with an offense punishable as a class B misdemeanor, the
prosecution
of which is suspended pursuant to a diversion agreement; and
(d) one year for:
(i) a class C misdemeanor conviction;
(ii) a plea of guilty or no contest to an offense punishable as a class C misdemeanor,
when the plea is held in abeyance according to a plea in abeyance agreement; or
(iii) being charged with an offense punishable as a class C misdemeanor, the
prosecution of which is suspended according to a diversion agreement.
(5) The hearing officer may double a suspension period established in Subsection (4)
for offenses:
(a) committed in violation of an existing suspension or revocation order issued by the
courts, division, or Wildlife Board; or
(b) involving the unlawful taking of a trophy animal, as defined in Section 23-13-2.
(6) (a) A hearing officer may suspend, according to Subsection (2), a person's license
or permit privileges for a particular license or permit only once for each single criminal
episode, as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(b) If a hearing officer addresses two or more single criminal episodes in a hearing, the
suspension periods of any license or permit privileges of the same type suspended,
according to Subsection (2), may run consecutively.
(c) If a hearing officer suspends, according to Subsection (2), license or permit
privileges of the type that have been previously suspended by a court, a hearing officer, or
the Wildlife Board and the suspension period has not expired, the suspension periods may
run consecutively.
(7) (a) A hearing officer, appointed by the division, may suspend a person's privilege
of applying for, purchasing, and exercising the benefits conferred by a certificate of
registration if:
(i) the hearing officer determines the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, as
defined in Section 76-2-103, violated:
(A) this title;
(B) a rule or order of the Wildlife Board;
(C) the terms of a certificate of registration; or
(D) the terms of a certificate of registration application or agreement; or
17

(ii) the person, in a court of law:
(A) is convicted of an offense that the hearing officer determines bears a reasonable
relationship to the person's ability to safely and responsibly perform the activities
authorized by the certificate of registration;
(B) pleads guilty or no contest to an offense that the hearing officer determines bears a
reasonable relationship to the person's ability to safely and responsibly perform the
activities authorized by the certificate of registration, and the plea is held in abeyance in
accordance with a plea in abeyance agreement; or
(C) is charged with an offense that the hearing officer determines bears a reasonable
relationship to the person's ability to safely and responsibly perform the activities
authorized by the certificate of registration, and prosecution of the offense is suspended in
accordance with a diversion agreement.
(b) All certificates of registration for the harvesting of brine shrimp eggs, as defined in
Section 59-23-3, shall be suspended by a hearing officer, if the hearing officer determines
the holder of the certificates of registration has violated Section 59-23-5.
(8) (a) The director shall appoint a qualified person as a hearing officer to perform the
adjudicative functions provided in this section.
(b) The director may not appoint a division employee who investigates or enforces
wildlife violations.
(9) (a) The courts may suspend, in criminal sentencing, a person's privilege to apply
for, purchase, or exercise the benefits conferred by a license, permit, or certificate of
registration.
(b) The courts shall promptly notify the division of any suspension orders or
recommendations entered.
(c) The division, upon receiving notification of suspension from the courts, shall
prohibit the person from applying for, purchasing, or exercising the benefits conferred by
a license, permit, or certification of registration for the duration and of the type specified
in the court order.
(d) The hearing officer shall consider any recommendation made by a sentencing court
concerning suspension before issuing a suspension order.
(10) (a) A person may not apply for, purchase, possess, or attempt to exercise the
benefits conferred by any permit, license, or certificate of registration specified in an
order of suspension while that order is in effect.
(b) Any license possessed or obtained in violation of the order shall be considered
invalid.
(c) A person who violates Subsection (10)(a) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(11) Before suspension under this section, a person must be:
(a) given written notice of any action the division intends to take; and
(b) provided with an opportunity for a hearing.
(12) (a) A person may file an appeal of a hearing officer's decision with the Wildlife
Board.
18

(b) The Wildlife Board shall review the hearing officer's findings and conclusions and
any written documentation submitted at the hearing.
(c) The Wildlife Board may:
(i) take no action;
(ii) vacate or remand the decision; or
(iii) amend the period or type of suspension.
(13) The division shall suspend and reinstate all hunting, fishing, trapping, and
falconry privileges consistent with Title 23, Chapter 25, Wildlife Violator Compact.
(14) The Wildlife Board may make rules to implement this section in accordance with
Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
Utah Code Ann- 23-19-9.1 (West 2004). Court-ordered action against a license.
The division shall promptly withhold, suspend, restrict, or reinstate the use of a license
issued under this chapter if so ordered by a court.
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